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Abstract.  This paper aims to analyze the determinants of state 
intervention upon the social and economic life, and to grasp their 
implications in terms of public policy. The study starts with an over time 
update of the main theoretical contributions. Some indicators that 
quantify the extent of state intervention throughout public revenues are 
analyzed on the EU member countries’ sample. Empirical analysis is 
aimed to establish the relevance held by the main determinants of state 
intervention in budgetary revenues for the EU countries (1995-2007). 
Perspectives on state interference during the actual crisis are drawn from 
the significant determinants of the interference policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this study is to examine the determinants of state 
intervention policy upon the economic and social life, starting with a theoretical 
background, continuing with a descriptive approach and ending with an 
empirical approach. The analyzed countries are the EU member states, observed 
during the 1995-2007 period. The study also captures the implications in terms 
of public policy under the current global economic crisis. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reunites the main theoretical 
contributions revealed over time with reference to the economic role of the state 
and its implications in budgetary terms; Section 3 is a descriptive analysis of 
state interventionism induced by the budgetary incomes in the EU; an empirical 
approach of this issue is presented in Section 4; and Section 5 sums the 
conclusions up. 
2. The role of the state in the economy – extreme ideologies  
and their reconciliation 
Being concerned about the origin of the state and its evolution, over time 
scientists have formulated a number of definitions for the concept of “state”, 
definitions which are based entirely on the notion of “human community”, or 
on that of “authority” to execute its power upon the community, or they simply 
combine the both by underlining their relationship. In this context, the state or 
public authority is concerned with the welfare of the community by appealing 
to the public budget or, in a wider view, to the public finances. The latter 
provides the state with the financial means necessary for the (physical, legal, 
business) protection of the community. Amongst the authors concerned by 
establishing the link between the human community, the state authority and 
public finances, or those interested in defining the role of state, we point out 
only a few:  E. Durkheim, I. Kant, M. Weber, L. Popescu, M. Burlacu,   
C. Tulai
(1).  
New economic processes and social relations of social product 
redistribution between the members of the state community were associated to 
the appearance of the first state institutions, at the transition from the tribal 
community to the slave-owning society. These types of relationships have 
developed progressively up to the modern society, as the functions of the state, 
the institutions under its supervision and implicitly the tasks undertaken by 
them have multiplied. Even the state budget was built in such a way as to meet 
the no assignment of public revenue rule and to allow the social product 
redistribution.  The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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 Why the need of redistribution? The first forms of state institutions 
(military, for example), through their activities, had a non-value added 
character, but consumed resources in order to operate. Hence the need to take 
charge, in the virtue of public strength, of the values obtained by the 
community members in their activities of social product creation and their 
usage for financing the resource consuming activities. So the premise for 
redistributing the social product from the private material sector to the 
immaterial sector of state institutions is represented by the unproductive nature 
of the latter. The redistributions of resources are meant to finance the state 
institutions which support the smooth running of the community’s social and 
economic life trough their activities. At least that appears to be the reason at a 
theoretical level, even though, in practice, the opportunity of redistribution is 
often situated under a question mark. 
The redistribution of resources through the state budget has gained some 
extra legitimacy when the state began to assume new tasks, by supporting, 
organizing, coordinating or adjusting the activities from the material, economic 
or productive sector. 
The developments undertaken by the state in terms of the tasks also led to 
certain changes for the degree of state intervention in the economy, and to the 
size of public budgets. Once the existence of the state had taken the necessary 
legitimacy and thus its costs were accepted, the over time concerns of the 
economists have been centered on the determination of an agreed level of state 
intervention through its budgetary policy. Many theses have been written in this 
field, having strong theoretical arguments and sometimes being inspired by the 
developments of the economy.  
Two extreme ideologies are primarily known: one promoting the pure 
liberalism and no intervention from the state, and the other based on state 
interference, as the only one able to harmonize the individual interests with the 
general one. Although the two schools of thought have had their origins in 
different centuries, the partisans of one ideology or the other have existed in 
every historical period, remaining a controversial topic until today. These 
controversies have gradually left some place for finding compromises between 
the two extremes, which in different cases have approached more or less 
interventionist influences (Maşca, 2008).  
The early stages of capitalist society up to the emergence of economic 
crises and unemployment have promoted a state which assumed itself only the 
traditional tasks (defense, internal order, etc.). The approved doctrine was the 
liberal one accompanied by the self-regulation principle of economic 
mechanisms, without state intervention in the economy, which could have led 
to inefficiency due to misadministration. Among the proponents of liberalism Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
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and non-intervention Adam Smith (1723-1790) should be noted first, as he 
promoted the well-known principle of “laissez-faire”. According to his opinion, 
as long as markets operate freely and promote competition, private individual 
actions, motivated by selfish interests, contribute together to the welfare of the 
society. However, Smith supports a minimum state involvement into setting the 
fundamental rules which allow the unrestricted behavior of companies. Among 
the states animated by the scourge of liberalism and which remained faithful to 
this ideology for a long time we have to mention the USA first. Smith's writings 
have deeply influenced the growth of the American capitalism and the US 
became a country built on trust in the individual and distrust of the authorities.  
The interventionism was ideologically sketched when capitalism faced 
previously unknown phenomena, such as the economic crises. Although the 
literature most often associates the debut of interventionism with the global 
crisis of the 30's, the first signs of an increased state involvement dates back to 
World War I (Burlacu, 2004). It then referred to amplifying the expressions 
held by the public finances due to the increased costs of the war. Therefore, the 
state's role has expanded by increasing the involvement of the state budget into 
supporting military expenditure. The effects of the economic reconstruction that 
followed the economic crisis were later associated to the costs of the war, all 
affecting the size of the state budget.  
Known as the crisis of “overproduction”, the crisis of the 30's showed that 
leaving the economy to self-regulate by its own mechanisms does not always 
lead to desirable effects, but it rather generates unemployment, instability of the 
stock market and banking sector. That was the moment when the interventionist 
thesis began to gain ground as it promoted the active role of the state in the 
economic life, in correcting the cyclical developments, in preventing crisis or 
limiting their negative effects. The main representative of the interventionist 
doctrine is John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), as his thesis has found a strong 
echo in the policy adopted by many states after the Great Depression (Maşca, 
2008). The new ideology manifested itself by increasing the state's involvement 
in the redistribution of resources, and by the activation of some economic 
instruments such as levers, for influencing the behaviors in society.  
State interventionism, as an ideology, has evolved from a compensatory 
type interventionism to a correction type one (Burlacu, 2004). If the first type 
involved state interference in order to reduce the side effects of economic 
cycles, responsible for the disequilibria within the economy, the correction type 
interventionism occurred later on, after the attenuation of crises, involving 
increased concerns for social protection. The two forms of state 
interventionism, through economic and social regulation, have also been used 
later on, taking different forms. In the economic sphere, the public authorities The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
 
21 
have been concerned, among others, by the price regulation and control of 
unfair competition practices in order to protect consumers and small businesses 
in the context of imperfect competition on market conditions. In the social 
sphere, the state focused to guarantee the security of one’s job or a clean 
environment; it has encouraged the conduct of companies with a positive 
impact upon society, and discouraged those with a negative impact, especially 
by using fiscal levers. Thus, state interferences on the economic and social 
environments were not isolated, an intervention on one of the two levels having 
repercussions in the other one as well. Even in the US, where the principle of 
laissez-faire prevailed, the history of the state registered requests of state 
interference by regulations on both plans. However, the general opinion of the 
US governors was that the regulations in economic relations did not improve 
competition as the sentences of interventionism stipulated. But there existed 
disputes between American liberals and conservatives when it came to discuss 
the problem of intervention in the social plan, as the first didn't see any danger 
in that interference, while the conservatives condemned it for the effect of 
inefficiency and lack of competitiveness upon the businesses. 
In the history an extreme form of state interventionism was the totalitarian 
one. The highly interventionist or socialist state, found mainly in the former 
socialist countries of Europe, had assumed extremely comprehensive economic 
and social functions, conducting the overall activity in terms of the abolition of 
private property. In that context, the processes and the economic relations had 
become predominantly financial public relations. The interventionist ideology 
is of totalitarian nature, the financial resources being available only to the state 
and allocated by decisions with a public character. That ideology hasn’t been 
approved by the democratic economies. 
Summarizing all that has been concluded till now and supporting 
Chandan (2009)’s idea, interventionism was born and developed into an 
ideology responding to market imperfections, as they served as a precondition 
for state interference in the private sector. 
Since the contributions of the main representatives, Adam Smith and 
Maynard Keynes, of the two major currents, belonged to different centuries, the 
following question appeared at one point: which of the two principles of 
“laissez faire” and government intervention prevailed at the end of the 18th 
century and 19th century? The interrogation belongs to Spengler J. (1949), who 
followed the conclusions of the studies of that time, and found that the role of 
laissez faire was greatly undervalued and that of interventionism was 
overstated. Spengler bases its claims on the easier trace tracking of 
interventionism than that of the traces associated with the laissez faire site. 
Thus, the measures of state intervention in economic and social life have been Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
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reflected into legislation, reports, etc., while the laissez faire site has manifested 
itself by the liberty of decisions, and has not been necessarily stated in 
documents.  
Another issue that has animated the first decades of interventionism 
concerned was the possible coexistence of government intervention and free 
competition. In 1946 Mordecai Ezekiel considered that some government 
policies opposed antitrust policies, while others had no effect on it, and others 
were responding to the desideratum of free competition. The author found a 
change of priorities, from what it was before the crisis – pricing flexibility for 
market self-regulation – to what it became preferred at the time of the crisis – 
reducing unemployment. Even in these new circumstances, the promoting of 
free competition was imposed; the monopoly could have generated unfair 
profits and could have risked worsening the income distribution, with side 
effects on the labor force occupancy rates. With the new trend of 
interventionism, governments have become more responsible in shaping the 
industrial policy, promoting free international trade and international 
cooperation for the economic policy decisions. However, at the time the author 
expressed concern that the problem of a declining free competition needed to be 
solved somehow else than by antitrust measures, namely through direct 
intervention.  
By confronting the divergent reasoning of the state’s intervention or non 
intervention in the economy
(2), and to a certain extent their reconciliation, the 
result has been known after the ’80s as the reasonable interventionism. The 
Keynesian interventionism was condemned especially for its inflationary effect 
of out of control deficits. Under the new ideology, the crucial role is the market 
and its laws, while the state is watching over the macroeconomic climate, the 
objectives of general interest. This is the hypothesis of the state as the game 
maker and the referee state, which coordinates and checks for the rules to be 
followed. 
By continuing to try to solve the dilemma of a possible coexistence of 
free market and state interventionism, in 1998 Dani Rodrik showed that 
government intervention is not a substitute for the free expression of market 
forces. From another perspective, most forms of government intervention, 
except for actions that provided public goods, are seen as unfavorable for the 
market. Rodrik (1998) showed that there was a positive correlation between a 
country's exposure to external trade relations and the size of the public budget. 
The explanation lies in the fact that government expenditures are meant to 
reduce the external risks the foreign trade-oriented economies are exposed to. 
The risk exposure is diminished by increasing the share of domestic output 
consumed by the government. At a high level of trade integration, the risks The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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associated to international business cycles are increasing, furthermore imposing 
compensation programs funded with public money in order to support the 
sectors exposed to these risks. Similarly, other authors show that the 
liberalization of international relations between European countries has been 
accompanied by a domestic counterbalancing strategy (public investment 
programs, subsidies). Considering this complementarity, the author suggests 
that, by reducing the size of public budgets in the future without taking into 
consideration the economic risks associated to the process of globalization, the 
preservation perspective on free trade could be affected.  
In 2002 Adsera and Boix continued on the same line drawn by Rodrik, by 
modeling the option for the degree of openness to international trade and for the 
size of the public sector, as the two political decisions taken simultaneously by 
the policy-makers. Their findings showed that a greater openness did not 
automatically constrain the ability to spend public money, facts that were 
checked every time public expenditure targeted the production of public goods 
(infrastructure, human capital). Moreover, the sustainability of an expanded 
public sector depends on the competitive advantages in the export-oriented 
sectors that finance public expenditure. If this competitive advantage is 
decreasing, the interest to support an expanded public sector is lost and the 
country shifts to a protective system or an authoritarian/totalitarian regime of 
free trade. 
Beyond this literature segment that identifies the opening to international 
trade as a determinant of the public sector’s size, the literature is relatively poor 
in offering other relevant determinants. However, we have to mention an 
important survey that belongs to Devine (1985), which makes a regression 
analysis of the determinants of public investment spending (production 
expenditure) and, separately, the consumer spending (non-productive 
expenditure such as education, healthcare, etc.), for the United States during 
1949-1977. The author's conclusion is that the determinants of the two 
expenditure categories vary considerably: if capital accumulation in the 
monopoly sectors and the political structure of the Congress represented the 
determining factors of sizing productive public spending, the economy 
structural factors (profitability, changes in nominal salary) and the political 
factor during elections would determine the consumer spending of the US in 
that period. 
Therefore, state interventionism has known various forms of 
manifestation, from increasing the state's involvement in supporting the army to 
the direct and indirect support of the economy, and then to the social 
interference in redistributing resources among the members of the society, and 
culminating with conducting which kept all activities under the control of the Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
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state. All these have in common the fact that the way of manifestation of the 
interventionism always came as a response to the political, economic and/or 
social context. 
The contemporary period, facing a global crisis that appears to exceed the 
proportion of that in the ‘30s, is promoting interventionism once again, taking 
the shape of a compensatory type interventionism rather than that of a 
correction type one. In this context, the state exceeds its referee status and it is 
becoming an active “player”, a direct participant to the economic activities. It 
regulates, but also runs its own economic activities. 
The new economic context which brings into question the role of the state 
once again is the result of several factors, as follows. The abundant liquidity 
and the supra-saturation of savings have created available resources for 
investment, especially for sophisticated financial instruments, hardly 
understood by investors because of their complexity; that resulted in an 
inefficient management of the resources. Moreover, the crisis has been 
aggravated by the behavior at the microeconomic level (rational outsourcing 
from the private point of view but inefficient from the social point of view), the 
cracks in the business models used by the rating agencies, and by the increasing 
international competition for deregulation. 
In the context of the crisis, the state’s involvement is crucial. Specifically, 
state interventionism in the US and European countries was done by 
guaranteeing loans or securities given by the banks, the recapitalization of 
financial institutions, even the acquisition of shares for the banks that faced 
difficulties, a coordinated decrease of the interest rates, all done in order to 
prevent a disordered collapse of the large interconnected firms and to improve 
the liquidity in the system (Isărescu, 2009). The nationalization of one part of 
the financial sector contradicts the foundations of modern capitalism and has as 
an immediate consequence the increase of the state's role while the private 
sector is decreasing. All these measures had implications upon the expenses of 
the state budget, increasing the share of domestic production redistributed 
through the public budget. 
Considering these actions of the State in times of crisis, the role of the 
state as a “lender of last resort” is questioned. For Breitenfellner and Wagner 
(2009), it is important not to suspend the market mechanisms in case of 
bankruptcy by financial support out of public money. The only institutions 
which the state should interfere for are those with liquidity problems but still 
solvent, and the financial support must be of a high cost. 
Regarding the possibility to trigger the components of budgetary revenues 
as leverages during the crisis, numerous debates have existed. We underline 
Barrell et al. (2009) opinion that brings arguments for fiscal relaxation as an The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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effective way of promoting economic growth in times of financial crisis. If the 
economy evolves normally the fiscal facilities have the unique role of 
redistributing the consumption in time without increasing its level or the one of 
the production. In times of crisis, however, the taxes can be triggered through 
incentives (especially for direct taxes and social contributions) in order to relax 
the credit market constraints that the consumers and businesses are facing. In 
this case, the tax facilities may become more efficient, having a multiplier 
effect on production levels, much higher than in the absence of crisis. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of these measures is even greater if they are 
taken in a coordinated framework for several countries at a time. 
Considering the vast proportions of the global economic crisis, stronger 
measures have to be considered, like the deep reform of the international 
financial system by improving the regulations of transparency, accounting, 
market efficiency, international cooperation, or regarding the ethics principles 
in business. These increased regulation measures need a more active role on 
behalf of the state, but not necessarily so profound in budgetary terms. On the 
other hand, in order to restore the confidence of investors and consumers which 
could support a positive trend of the economy through their actions, additional 
resources from the state budget are required. Moreover, the difficulties faced by 
the real sector create disadvantages even in the social plan through layoffs, 
where the state should apply social protection measures. Breitenfellner and 
Wagner (2009) also believe that the immediate financial measures taken by 
public authorities are not sufficient, having a short-term impact; improvements 
are needed in the risk management field. The public financial support of 
institutions with problems temporarily avoids the system’s collapse, but on the 
long-term an improvement of government regulations is needed. 
The contemporary crisis determined the public authorities to some 
behaviors that have been considered opposed to the competition rules on the 
market by authors like Aggarwal (2009). Thus, because of the desire to promote 
national companies and protect them in times of crisis from the competition 
with the global firms, the state used hidden forms of intervention. These took 
the shape of health and safety standards, environmental policies etc. that offered 
competitive benefits to the national firms, in a very discriminatory and hidden 
way as for the other companies.  
Arbitration between giving priority to market forces and promoting state 
intervention, acquired new values with the manifestation of the contemporary 
crisis. In the opinion of Verschoor (2009), the crisis showed that the market is 
not efficient to control the unethical practices caused by greed, 
misunderstanding of the mechanisms, or herd behavior. Society has changed its 
view on the legitimacy of business, seeking structural changes to the system, Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
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including the increasing government influence upon businesses. However, 
debate remains on whether a more stringent regulation of the market through 
state intervention would be effective in combating unethical practices or not. In 
other words, would state intervention fight against those behaviors that the 
market failed to remove, or would it lead to a reoccurrence of the disaster? 
Interventionism might fail.  
If the current crisis is usually attributed to market failures, there are 
authors (Wolfram, 2008) which consider that the government actions are 
responsible for today’s financial difficulties. The repeated interference of the 
state on the credit market (financially supporting certain credit institutions with 
problems, creating the secondary mortgage market, etc.) brought a relaxation on 
the short term, but proved itself dangerous on the long term, requiring new 
interventions from the authorities. This idea is consistent with the thesis of 
Ludwig von Mises, that advocated in his “Liberalism” book, that government 
intervention is likely to maintain itself. 
Finally, regarding the current trend of increasing the state’s role in the 
economic and social life, a new question rises: that of the possibility of its 
withdrawal once the economy recovered. History shows that the transition from 
Keynes' interventionism to the era of a reasonable state intervention wasn't a 
spectacular one as it was rather characterized by limited budget size growth, 
than by its reduction (Maşca, 2008). At present, once the state has committed to 
strongly support several problem areas, it becomes hard to imagine a relief of 
these responsibilities after the economy would enter on the right track. This is a 
relatively new issue, raised in the US, clearly concerned about this issue due to 
their deeply liberal traditions. American analysts view US government 
intervention in the economy as a highly complex one, anticipating difficulties in 
the withdrawal of state guarantees or of the advanced sums. Experts, however, 
consider the possibility to use levers for this purpose, e.g. a growth of the 
interest rates so that the loans from the state to become unattractive. There are 
some opinions according to which the government will not be able to withdraw 
itself if the private capitals don’t return to the market within a three year period, 
all depending on how quickly the market recovers (Blackwell, 2008). In 
budgetary terms, it is likely to witness an irreversible increase of its size. 
The interference of a supranational authority is also assigned to the issue 
of state intervention. Each state's policy regarding the extent it interferes in 
economic and social life or in the dimension of the public budget cannot be 
taken independently from the regional policy. If we refer to the European area, 
the European Union acts as a supranational authority that can influence the 
budget policy pursued by its Member States through its requirements. The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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Communitarian Europe has experienced the extension of its public sector 
throughout the last century, getting to redistribute 40% of GDP through the 
Member State's budgets. And the largest increase in public spending was due to 
the expansion of the redistributive function in the field of social protection, in 
order to support the transfers of resources from the active to the inactive or 
weaker population (Mitrică, 2006). The coordinates of the EU policy with 
impact upon the public budgets of the Member States are particularly those in 
the field of taxation and budget deficits, and less the ones in the sphere of 
public spending. EU requirements in the area of taxation aimed to increase 
taxation levels in order to avoid situations of unhealthy tax competition, which 
would have after-effects upon the national budgets as a whole and therefore in 
terms of public expenditure. The size of budget revenues and expenditures is 
also constrained by the existence of a budget deficit of at most 3% of GDP. 
The current global economic crisis weakens the influence of the 
supranational authority, as the majority of EU states are facing difficulties in 
budgetary policy, that in these times is less subjected to EU requirements and 
more strictly devoted to national needs. For 2009, budget deficits have 
exceeded 3% of GDP in almost all EU countries, EU-27 average reached 5.3%, 
and, paradoxically, this was more due to EU-15 countries (average 5.5% 
deficit) and less to the new Member States (NMS-12 with the average deficit of 
only 2.7%). For 2010 a further deterioration of the state budget’s balance is 
expected, by 0.6% on average since 2009, and for the 2011-2015 periods, we 
should assist to a close come-back to the 3% threshold (Holland et al., 2009). 
For the states that joined the EU after 2004, wider budget deficits would affect 
the performance of the Maastricht criteria and would delay the adopting of euro. 
Although the cohesion in the EU region is weakened in these times of 
crisis, some authors (Barrell et al., 2009, Buti, van den Noord, 2009) call for a 
coordinated policy in the area. These should aim to increase the effectiveness of 
national policies on fiscal relaxation (Barrell, 2009), but also to internalize the 
consequences which would have isolated national policies in the region (Buti 
and van den Noord, 2009). According to the authors’ beliefs, only a coordinated 
policy in response to the crisis would enhance the degree of economic 
integration in the region. Meanwhile, the European Commission is responsible 
for ensuring a balance between short-term emergency measures and long term 
priorities. 
In a wider vision, the state’s role in the global economy has been 
redefined and revalued since the end of the 20th century, due to the 
fragmentation of the global economy by creating regional economic blocs on 
one hand, and to the generating interdependences’ globalization on the other 
hand. Bucur (2008) discusses on the effects of global interdependences over the Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
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national state force and its capabilities, the general manager position in the 
economy and the autonomous actor. The author believes that globalization has 
weakened the state’s sovereignty, its independence being undermined both from 
the inside and the outside. The state’s role in the 21
st century is undergoing 
evident changes, especially for the used tools and mechanisms in relation to the 
economy. The power and the influence of international economic organizations 
is increased on the expense of state control. In this context, at least in theory, 
nations may either give “prevailed” to the market or submit themselves to a 
supranational authority. Stating that the state crosses the deepest crisis of 
legitimacy in its history, Bucur (2008) considers that the state will still continue 
to play an important role in the economic life, as the ways and dimensions of 
intervention are under the process of rebuilding and rethinking. 
If the period before the global crisis was characterized, as we have seen, 
by some national prerogatives assumed by the international economic 
organizations and other institutions and autonomous bodies, we are currently 
witnessing a reverse phenomenon. Global governance structures have become 
extremely fragile. WTO trade negotiations collapsed and are unlikely to restart 
soon. Institutions, like the IMF, have been marginalized, the UNO has become 
invisible and powerless in front of the global economic and social problems and 
the EU is struggling to maintain internal cohesion (Cable, 2008). In that 
context, we are witnessing a reverse transfer of powers, towards the national 
authorities, whose role in solving the financial crisis problems strengthens. And 
the role of international organizations needs to be redesigned, as the 
modernization of IMF, World Bank and other bodies’ governance structures is 
imposed. 
Summing up, state interventionism is a present phenomenon which found 
itself under the influence of factors such as interstate differences, economic 
crises, social crises, political governance within the country, regional policy and 
globalization over time. 
 
3. State interventionism in the European Union – descriptive analysis 
 
State interventionism is suitable to quantification by dividing the total 
revenue or total state budget expenditures to the GDP. In this study we focus on 
the analysis of state interventionism determined based on budget revenues, 
whereas the indicator calculated based on spending will be the subject of 
another study. 
Methodologically speaking, the measures associated with state 
interventionism can be expressed in a diverse manner. Our preference regards 
(i) public revenue and expenditure reflected in the general consolidated budget, The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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because it has the widest coverage, (ii) the relative size of public revenue and 
expenditure which allows international comparisons, and (iii) the overall 
volume of the budget, and the elements of its structure. 
 
Budget revenues in the EU (%GDP)
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Note: The countries are ranked from those that founded the EU to the successive waves 
of accession. 
 
Source: Authors’ processing based on Eurostat data. 
 
Figure 1. State interventionism induced by budget revenues in the EU, 1997-2008 
 
State intervention indicator calculated based on budgetary revenue leads 
to the following conclusions (Figure 1). The successive waves of EU 
enlargement have grouped the countries with common characteristics in terms 
of state intervention degree. The first remark is the fact that there existed groups 
of countries with an average interventionism alternating those with high Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
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interventionism and those with low interventionism. All countries find 
themselves within the range of 30-60%. If we split this interval in three groups, 
we may say that the founding countries have entered the medium-type group 
(40-50% GDP state interventionism), the most countries that joined in the years 
1970-1980 are in the lower type group (30 - 40%), the countries that entered the 
EU in the '90s form the superior type group (50-60%) and the countries of 21st 
century are situated in the medium-low group. We found the highest values of 
state intervention in Sweden, Finland and Austria (EU members from 1995), 
but also in Denmark (EU member since 1973). The lowest values are specific to 
Ireland (1973) and especially to the Baltic countries (2004) and Romania 
(2007). Countries that are in the medium and especially higher group are 
usually developed countries. A pattern is emerging: an increased 
interventionism is usually associated to the developed countries, while a lower 
interventionism is associated to the least developed ones. This is natural to 
happen, because where there is a high standard of living, there’s also a high 
contributive capacity, furthermore the possibility to attract significant resources 
for the budget. 
In terms of evolution, we cannot speak of an absolute convergence of 
state interventionism at EU level (there aren’t any evident tendencies to get near 
the value indicator), which stands for keeping the attribute of national 
sovereignty for the sizing area of state interference. We may rather consider a 
diversification of the states in this area than the formation of a unitary European 
state model, with similar interferences in the economic and social life. 
Knowing that this calculated indicator (the ratio of budgetary revenue in 
GDP) cumulates government intervention on the private sector (individuals and 
legal entities) but also that upon the state sector, we preferred to consider, in 
addition, the indicator that isolated state interference through taxes and 
contributions collected from the private environment. 
Figure 2 shows the averages registered by this indicator in the EU and in 
the euro area, which are exceeding 40% in both cases and taking higher values 
in the euro area. The degree of state intervention through taxes and 
contributions is highlighted with maximum values for the more interventionist 
countries (Sweden), and minimum values for the less interventionist countries 
(Lithuania). In the first case, the indicator exceeds 50%, while in the second 
case it falls just below 30%. Although the earlier analysis didn't register a 
pattern for the development of interventionism in the EU, by taking into 
account only the taxes and contributions, a similar evolution is noticed for both 
the average and the extreme levels. We observe an upward trend of 
interventionism till 1999, followed by a loop, a decrease with a minimum point 
reached around 2003, then followed again by an increase in the recent years. The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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Figure 2. Total receipts from taxes and social contributions in EU (% GDP), 1995-2007 
 
Regarding public expenditure, a similar study that is not reported here, 
but is available on request, shows a decreasing trend for the degree of state 
intervention induced by expenditures, both for the averages and the extremes. 
By correlating these two findings, we may say that indicator revenue-
based indicator (taxes and contributions) has gradually adjusted to the 
expenditure policy, but also to the economic developments and cyclical 
evolutions (Figure 3). Thus, at the end of the 20
th century, budget revenues have 
increased after a period of economic recovery in order to get the budget deficit 
within the imposed limits; at the beginning of the 21
st century, budget revenues 
have declined following the trend of  expenditures and because of a fiscal 
relaxation policy aimed to stimulate the slightly declining economy; the recent 
years have again brought the increase of budget revenues because of the 
economic progress,  and the continuous decrease of budget spending. 
According to the latest updates from Eurostat, the year 2008 was characterized 
by an increase in public expenditure (47% of GDP on average) due to the 
current context of global crisis that requires significant measures of supporting 
the economic and social environment with public money. 
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Figure 3. State interventionism induced by budget expenditure  
and revenue in the Euro area, 1995-2007 
 
The studies carried out before (Maşca, 2008) show that the state is 
currently present especially for providing social protection, education and 
healthcare and for financing the general public services. From all of these, 
here we are mainly interested in the social protection budget expenditure, to 
which we add the public costs of supporting economic affairs, because these 
two categories make the difference between the more or less interventionist 
states. If the state has a significant overall interference in a certain country, 
then social protection in that country will be favored as compared to the 
other states. On the other hand, for the less interventionist states, the 
economic affairs are usually financially supported more than in the other 
states. 
 The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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Figure 4. The positioning of EU countries related to the average costs of social protection  
and economic affairs coordinates, 2007 
 
According to Figure 4, the social protection in the EU gathered on 
average 18% of GDP in 2007, the minimum values falling below 10% and the 
maximum ones beyond even 22%. In the same year, the budgetary expenditure 
for Economic Affairs in the EU raised on average to 3.8% of GDP, with a 
minimum of 2.8% and a maximum of 6.9%. Most of the EU member states 
follow the above mentioned pattern. Countries such as Germany, Denmark and 
France are heavily interventionist countries that invest in welfare more than the 
EU average. Also, the less interventionist states like Romania, Czech Republic, 
Malta, Spain, Baltic States, Ireland, Poland, and Slovakia are those that support 
the economic affairs with public money, to a greater extent than the EU 
average. There also are exceptions, deviations from this pattern; a relevant 
example is the case of Sweden, the most interventionist EU state, with an above 
the average interference in economic affairs, and well below the average 
interference in financing its social protection. 
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On average, the EU states allocated four to five times more money to the 
social welfare than to the economic affairs (the ratio was 4.73 in 2007). Only 
four of the 27 EU member states exceed this threshold, i.e. Germany, France, 
Denmark and Britain (Table 1). The orientation of these countries towards an 
extremely active social involvement detrimental to the economic environment 
becomes very clear. 
 
Table 1 
The ration between expenditure on social protection (SP) and expenditure  
on economic affairs (EA) in 2007 
COUNTRY SP/EA  COUNTRY  SP/EA COUNTRY  SP/EA 
BELGIUM 3.35  GREECE  4.23  CZECH  REPUBLIC  1.87 
GERMANY 5.83  SPAIN  2.65  LITHUANIA  2.52 
FRANCE 7.93  PORTUGAL  4.61  LATVIA  1.71 
ITALY 4.55  AUSTRIA  4.33  ESTONIA  2.18 
LUXEMBOURG 3.95 FINLAND  4.52 POLAND  3.49 
NETHERLANDS 3.47  SWEDEN  2.47  SLOVAKIA  3.88 
DENMARK 6.38  MALTA  2.32  SLOVENIA  4.60 
IRELAND 2.08  CYPRUS  2.30  ROMANIA  1.46 
UNITED KINGDOM  5.28  HUNGARY  2.66  BULGARIA  2.62 
Source: Authors’ processing based on Eurostat data. 
 
4. The determinants of state interventionism in the EU – an empirical study 
 
4.1. Model, data and methodology 
 
Through our empirical analysis we aim to identify the relevant 
determinants of state interventionism through public revenues in the EU
(3). The 
selection criteria of them are based on our insights and the theoretical 
fundamentals; we consider the following relevant factors: (i) the development 
level of the country, (ii) the taxation from other countries and (iii) the structure 
of public expenditure. 
(i) Intuitively, the more the development level of a country increases, the 
more consistent the tax base is, and the contributive capacity of the taxpayers is 
higher, which creates the resources to increase budget revenues, and it 
implicitly enlarges the interventionist area. On the other hand, a favorable 
economic trend is immediately reflected in terms of the population’s welfare, so 
an increased interference from the state becomes unnecessary.  
(ii) Taxation in neighboring countries may exert two adverse effects: tax 
coordination effect and tax competition effect, both phenomena being found in 
Europe. First, fiscal coordination in the EU implies a response in a common 
direction from the fiscal policy of member states: usually, European exigencies The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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demand a taxation rise, so national tax burden need to be increased as well. 
Secondly, the effect of tax competition leads to a decrease of the budget 
revenues (fiscal incentives) when the tax burden of the neighboring territories 
decreases. This happens especially for different territories, in similar stages of 
economic development that are competing to attract capital. The absence of a 
similar response to “fiscal dumping” can seriously affect tax revenues on 
mobile factors that would migrate.  
(iii) Finally, as the budget gives priority in financing those expenses that 
allow a good reversibility (social protection, education, healthcare, sport, 
culture), the taxpayers will more easily agree to the increase in fiscal pressure, 
hence the resources for the extension of interventionism.  
Our empirical study is based on a panel composed of 27 countries 
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom) selected as the EU member countries and 
analyzed during the 1995-2007 period.  
 
The empirical specification takes the following form: 
 
it it it it it it
t t
t t t it it
e PS c HT c ED c SP c EA c
NOR TB c RO TB c
SE TB c LT TB c EU TB c GDP c c SI
+ × + × + × + × + × +
+ × + × +
+ × + × + × + × + =
11 10 9 8 7
6 5
4 3 2 1 0
_ _
_ _ _
 
 
The description of the variables
(4) is the following: 
SI is the degree of interventionism in country i (i = 1, ..., 27) at time t (t = 
1995, ..., 2007), calculated as the percentage ratio between the total budgetary 
revenue and GDP (the budgetary revenues are the ones from the consolidated 
general budget) 
GDP is the gross domestic product of country i at time t, representing the 
percentage of EU-27 GDP. Having expressed state interventionism relatively to 
GDP imposes the use of the exogenous variable associated to the GDP in a 
relative form, as well. This determinant is introduced in order to capture the 
effect of the development level of the country (expressed in relative terms) 
upon the degree of state intervention. 
TB_EU the overall tax burden in the EU-25 is calculated as a percentage 
of all tax obligations (including contributions) to GDP. The presence of this 
factor is justified by the fact that it is a proxy for a coordinated taxation level in 
other countries (a proxy for the participation in EU tax coordination process; a Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
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proxy for the opening towards regional policy). But since Europe is a 
heterogeneous area, by bringing together countries with high diversity in terms 
of taxation, we had to add four more variables in the model (TB_LT, TB_SE, 
TB_RO and TB_NOR), a proxy for tax competition (a proxy for the opening 
towards market forces under globalization context).  
TB_LT is the overall tax burden in Lithuania (% GDP), Lithuania has 
been chosen as the country with the lowest taxation in the EU.  
TB_SE is overall tax burden in Sweden (% GDP), Sweden was chosen as 
the country with the highest taxes in the EU.  
TB_RO is overall tax burden in Romania (% GDP), Romania was chosen 
as one of the countries with the lowest taxation in the EU, for which we have 
particular interest.  
TB_NOR is overall tax burden in Norway (% GDP), Norway has been 
chosen as one of the countries with the highest taxes in Europe, but outside the 
EU area. Entering this variable is meant to check whether EU budgetary policy 
is sensitive to that taken in its vicinity.  
The following variables are proxies for the composition of public 
expenditure: expenditure on economic affairs, social protection, education, 
healthcare and public services. They are the most important categories of 
budgetary expenditure of EU Member States, among which expenditure on 
social protection and economic affairs have a special interest (see previous 
discussion).  
EA is the spending for economic affairs share in GDP for the country i 
and at the time t. 
SP represents the weight of social protection expenditure in GDP in the 
country i and at time t. 
ED is the share of public spending on education in GDP in country i at 
time t. 
HT is the share of public spending on healthcare in GDP in country i at time t. 
PS is the share of expenditures with public services in GDP in country i at 
time t. 
A set of dummy variables is added to these exogenous variables. The 
dummy_country variables capture the characteristics associated to each country 
in the sample that may influence the degree of state intervention (a specific 
public policy or more or less liberal guidelines of the government, for example). 
Before making regressions, we analyze the correlations graphics between 
the dependent variable and the most relevant explanatory variables (see 
Appendix). The link between per capita GDP (expression of a country's 
development level) and revenue (also expressed per capita) is a very strong one 
for the European countries (centered R2 is 0.99). An increase of per capita GDP The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
 
37 
with 1 euro would determine an increase of budget revenues with 0.40 euro. 
The charts reveal a positive correlation between the development level of the 
country and public social protection expenditure on the one hand, and state 
interventionism calculated based on budgetary revenues, on the other hand. 
Furthermore the econometric analysis should prove the significance of these 
correlations. 
The estimates were carried out after the panel techniques, by using the 
WinRATS software. The estimate method is the GLS, in a model with random 
individual effects. We prefer random effects panel techniques for at least three 
reasons: (1) the panel is preferred compared to the „cross-country race” analysis  
when having a relative small sample (27 countries); it brings more robustness to 
the results because it also exploits the temporal dimension of the data (13 
years); (2) it is appreciated that there exist consistent and specific individual 
effects that are not observed, which influence the endogenous variable beyond 
the selected exogenous variables (the individual effects are preferred to the 
pool); (3) it is supposed that the individual effects are random (the random 
effects are preferred to the fixed effects, even if the results under fixed effects 
methodology do not differ significantly from those under random effects).  
The specific characteristics of every country from the sample justify the 
integration of a heterogeneous dimension within the model, respectively the 
individual effects materialized into own specific constants for each individual 
of the panel. A model with individual effects is represented as follows: 
[ ] [ ] periods T s individual N T t N i x y it it i it , , , 1 , , 1 , ∈ ∈ + × + = ε β α  
The equal coefficient β  hypothesis  [ ] N i i , 1 , ∈ = β β  is accepted, but the 
common constant α  hypothesis is rejected for all individuals. In a random 
effect model, the residuals’ structure is the following:  it t i it v + + = λ α ε , where 
i α  stands for the random individual effects (the structural or out of time 
specificities for each individual),  t λ  stands for the temporal effects (factors that 
identically influence the individuals’ sample, but the factors vary with time), 
and  it v  stands for the factors that influence the endogenous variable differently 
with time and from one individual to another. it ε  are independent and 
identically-distributed. The BLUE estimator is the GLS estimator. Furthermore, 
we may say that the random effect model is an intermediary specification 
between the no individual effect model and the fixed effect model. The 
hypothesis for a common distribution of the individual effects permits 
considering a structure that is neither totally homogenous, nor totally 
heterogeneous (see also Sevestre, 2002). Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
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4.2. Results 
 
Results of regressions are summarized in the table below. 
Table 2  
State interventionism determinants and their significance 
Independent 
variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP  0.28** 
(0.03) 
0.28** 
(0.03) 
0.28** 
(0.03) 
0.24** 
(0.02) 
0.17* 
(0.05)  0.21 (0.12) 
TB_EU  0.74*** 
(0.00) 
1.82*** 
(0.00) 
1.04** 
(0.01) 
0.93** 
(0.02) 
0.85** 
(0.03) 
TB_LT      0.01 (0.93)  0.15 (0.20)  0.20* 
(0.06) 
0.21** 
(0.04) 
TB_SE    -0.23** 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.34) 
-0.02 
(0.78) 
-0.04 
(0.63) 
TB_RO    -0.14 
(0.37) 
0.49*** 
(0.00) 
0.74*** 
(0.00) 
0.82*** 
(0.00) 
TB_NOR     -0.39*** 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.42) 
-0.07 
(0.56) 
-0.05 
(0.65) 
EA       0.33*** 
(0.00) 
0.32*** 
(0.00) 
0.32*** 
(0.00) 
SP       0.83*** 
(0.00) 
0.57*** 
(0.00) 
0.47*** 
(0.00) 
ED         1.46*** 
(0.00) 
1.51*** 
(0.00) 
HT         0.46*** 
(0.00)  0.30 (0.10) 
PS         0.54*** 
(0.00) 
0.53*** 
(0.00) 
DUMMY 
COUNTRY        x  
Obs  340  340 340 312 312 311 
R2  centered  0.92  0.93 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.96 
Note:  Brackets contain p-values. *** means 1% significant coefficients, ** 5% 
significant and * 10% significant. The total number of observations is 351 (i.e. 27 countries 
observed over 13 years). 
Source: Authors’ processing. 
 
An R2 that is gradually increasing with the addition of new variables is a 
clue for an increasing explanatory power of the specification; the last two 
specifications explain the degree of state intervention based on incomes best. 
The hypothesis according to which the country's development level 
influences the public interventionist policy is not definitely supported by the 
regressions’ results; having a relatively high degree of significance in the first 
regressions, the coefficient of the GDP variable (calculated in relative terms) The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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loses its importance by adding new variables. However, the influence, although 
not very strong, seems to be a positive one. Moreover, in absolute terms, the per 
capita budget revenues are strongly correlated with the per capita GDP of EU 
countries (see Appendix). This shows that, in general, the developed EU 
countries are characterized by a high interventionism, while the less developed 
EU countries involve the state in economic and social life less. The absence of 
significance of the GDP in the final regression may be explained by the 
contrary effect, also anticipated at the theoretical level, according to which as 
the country develops, state interventionism becomes outdated and the state 
partially withdraws from the economic and social life. 
The theoretically stipulated assertion according to which tax burden in 
this regional union influences state involvement through the state budget in 
each of the EU countries, is empirically tested through regressions (2) - (6). The 
increase of the tax burden in the EU with 1% of the EU GDP causes, on 
average, the increase of state interventionism in the member countries with 
0.85% of those countries’ GDP. This aspect confirms the existence of some sort 
of coordination of the fiscal policies within the EU. Comparing the coefficients 
associated to the economical development variable and to the European fiscal 
pressure variable, we may conclude that state interventionism is more 
influenced by the latter. With this result, we agree to some other authors’ 
conclusions, like Rodrik (1998) and Adsera and Boix (2002), who found a 
positive correlation between the openness to international trade and the public 
sector size. In our particular case, there is a strong positive link between the 
openness to the regional policy of fiscal coordination and the dimension of the 
state budget. 
Among the countries with extreme taxation of Europe, Romania and 
Lithuania only seem to have influenced tax policy and state interventionism 
implicitly in the level of budget revenues of EU countries. Member countries 
reduce their interference in the budget by 0.82% of GDP respectively by 0.21% 
of GDP, at a reduction of the tax burden by 1% in Romania, respectively in 
Lithuania. This is the result of tax competition which coexists with the EU 
fiscal coordination. Fiscal relaxation in countries like Romania and Lithuania 
leads to the reduction of taxes in the neighboring areas as well, causing them 
the possibility to loose their mobile factors as a source of tax base. Not even 
Sweden, as an EU member, or Norway, a neighbor of the EU, through their 
burdensome tax policy, affect neither taxation nor state interventionism in the 
EU countries. This time, we found a strong link between the opening to the 
market forces that generate tax competition and the size of the state budget 
(resembling the findings of Rodrik, 1998, respectively Adsera and Boix, 2002). Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
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As for the impact of the structure of state expenditure upon the degree of 
state interventionism calculated based on revenues, it’s not surprising that it is 
positive and significant for all categories of expenditures; as the share of GDP 
allocated for economic affairs, social protection, education, healthcare, public 
services increases, budgetary revenues increase as well, in order to support this 
additional expenditure, and therefore state interventionism increases. The 
relative size of the coefficients associated to the variables of different 
expenditure types are of a great importance here. Firstly, state interference for 
the support of social protection involves a greater legitimacy than the financing 
of economic affairs, explaining the increase of state interventionism based on 
revenue growth better (in regression no. 4, the EA variable has a coefficient of 
0.33, lower than the coefficient of the SP variable, 0.83). By comparing the 
coefficients associated to the cost components in regression no. 6, we may 
conclude that the growth in EU interventionism was made possible through the 
state’s additional funding commitments especially in the field of education, 
public services and social protection. It appears that mainly these fields are the 
public areas where Europeans expect and legitimize state intervention.  
Among the dummy variables associated to each country, the ones 
significant and with a positive influence in explaining state interventionism are 
particularly the ones of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden. Five of these countries (except Bulgaria) are the most interventionist 
European countries, registering a tradition for this public policy. Denmark, 
Finland, Austria justify their interventionism especially through social 
protection measures, while economic affairs find an important legitimacy in 
Sweden, Belgium and Bulgaria. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The issue of quantifying the degree of state interventionism in the 
economic and social life regained its popularity in the contemporary period, 
also taking into account the fact that the difficulties the global economy is 
facing require the active involvement of the state, perhaps more than ever. 
After having argued for the discussion around the state budget through the 
existence of the state and the cash needs of the human community, our study 
has presented the main arguments made on the extent of state intervention. 
Admitting the contradiction between the ideologies formulated by Smith and 
Keynes, the authors try to bring these issues together, by making an inventory 
and commenting on the contributions of that literature segment that supports the 
coexistence of the free market with state interventionism. The idea according to 
which state interference comes as a response to market failure is partly The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU 
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removed; moreover, it may be the result of a self-maintaining state 
interventionism. 
For evaluating the state's role in the economic and social life and its 
evolution, a lot of “forces” are considered: market forces, regional power 
authority, and the force of international organizations. We believe that nations 
should not “abandon” themselves to one or some of these forces exclusively, as 
the national state must retain its relative autonomy. 
In fact, the contemporary period brings a new perspective upon the 
national state, that of the state as a manager of the crisis’ effects, because the 
other “forces” have failed. It is high time for the world's states, through an 
appropriate fiscal policy (correlated with the monetary and institutional policy) 
to find the best solutions for getting out of the crisis. As we have seen, the use 
of budgetary expenditure components as leverages, as it has occurred so far, 
raises some questions in terms of efficiency; furthermore, an adequate budget 
revenue policy (fiscal relaxation) should provide real solutions for crisis's 
problems. 
The descriptive and empirical results of our analysis can be summarized 
as follows. 
The descriptive part of the study tries to establish two connections: (1) 
between state intervention and the development level of the country, 
respectively (2) between the size of state interference and the structure of public 
expenditure, with emphasis on social protection and  economic affairs 
expenditure. This study is designed to identify response patterns of response of 
state interventionism to its most important determinants, namely to capture the 
evolving patterns, the trends. 
According to our empirical results, the interventionism induced by budget 
revenues in the EU countries was significantly determined by the coordinated 
EU tax policy, the compensation measures in the context of fiscal competition 
between regions, but also the structure of public expenditure. The effect of the 
development level is less obvious, which hasn’t surprised our expectations 
concerning a possible positive influence or a negative one. We may say that the 
1995-2007 period was characterized by a correction type state interventionism 
in the EU, with a slight general trend for state withdrawal out of the economic 
and social life, because of a relatively positive evolution of the economy, a 
strict monitoring of national budgets carried out by the EU, and a certain 
exposure to tax competition.  
Starting with 2008, we have witnessed an up growing compensating type 
state interventionism, which comes to fill the economic shortfalls created by the 
crisis, namely the downward economic trend. The increase of state interference 
has become more legitimate since it targeted measures of social protection; Simona-Gabriela Maşca, Viorela Ligia Văidean, Andreea Golguţ 
 
42 
actually in many cases, the current interference of the state in the economy 
produces passionate disputes. The regional fiscal policy is situated in a second 
plane, as a determinant of state interventionism in the EU Member States, 
considering the weakening of the Union and the transfer of powers to the 
national authorities. The effect of tax competition is gaining ground in the new 
context, resulting in budgetary reactions of providing advantages to attract the 
so-long desired capitals. 
We believe that the state’s withdrawing from the social and economic 
life,  while the economy would enter into an upward trend after the crisis, is 
possible primarily by reducing social security expenditure, many of them no 
longer necessary with an increasing labor employment. 
For Romania, as it has until recently been characterized by a reasonable 
interventionism, one of the lowest in Europe, we may say that its increase is 
possible in order to compensate the crisis’ effects; increased state interference 
can be achieved mainly on account of social protection expenditure, but less on 
the account of economic less legitimate expenditure that are already situated 
above the EU average. The increase of state interventionism in Romania must 
take into account the budget conditions imposed by the EU for accessing 
European funds, even if we are currently witnessing a widespread relaxation of 
the constraints imposed by the EU. 
 
 
Notes 
 
(1)  For details, see Burlacu M. (2004), Popescu L. (2002), Tulai C. (2003). 
(2) Regarding other controversies for the economic role of the state, see Avramescu & 
Ungureanu, 2009. 
(3) The econometric modeling of the state interventionism through public expenditure will be the 
subject of another study.  
(4)  The values for each variable come from statistics provided by Eurostat. 
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